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A B S T RAC T
This text is devoted to showing that from the point of view of the tasks 
of science dealing with the description and explanation of the different 
aspects of religion, the post secular turn is only apparent. Its ostensi­
bleness lies in the fact that the program articulated by post-secular phi­
losophers suffers from a number of defects. Their accumulation leads 
to the conclusion that the post secular paradigm has never existed even 
as the seed of a theory of religious phenomena, but it has some of the 
characteristics of an ideology.
 This article reconstructs subjects key philosophical positions asso­
ciated with the post secular turn (Philip Blond, Gianni Vattimo, John 
D. Caputo, Jürgen Habermas) to critical analysis in an effort to extract 
the relevant properties of post secular philosophy to indicate major de­
ficiencies. Next, I deal with the most important issue emerging from 
this analysis, namely, the question adopted by the post secular philoso­
phers of religion. In the last part I formulate conclusions regarding the 
applicability of post secular philosophy as a theoretical tool explaining 
the situation of religion in the post-modern world.
K E Y W O R D S :    post secularism, philosophy of religion, ideology, 
the concept of religion
S T R E S Z C Z E N I E
Filozofia postsekularna. Między teorią a ideologią
Tekst ten poświęcony jest wykazaniu, że z punktu widzenia zadań na­
uki zajmującej się opisem i  wyjaśnieniem różnych aspektów religii, 
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zwrot postsekularny jest zwrotem pozornym. Pozorność ta polega na 
tym, że program wyartykułowany przez filozofów postsekularnych 
cierpi na szereg defektów. Ich nagromadzenie prowadzi do wniosku, 
że paradygmat postsekularny nigdy nie istniał nawet jako zalążek teo­
rii zjawisk religijnych, natomiast posiada pewne cechy ideologii.
 W tekście tym rekonstruuję i poddaję krytycznej analizie kluczo­
we stanowiska filozoficzne związane ze zwrotem postsekularnym 
(Philip’a Blond’a, Gianni’ego Vattimo, John’a D.  Caputo, Jürgen’a 
Habermas’a) starając się wyodrębnić właściwe cechy filozofii postse­
kularnej i wskazać jej najważniejsze braki. Następnie zajmuję się naj­
ważniejszym problemem wyłaniającym się z tej analizy, jakim jest za­
gadnienie przyjmowanego przez filozofów postsekularnych pojęcia 
religii. W ostatniej części formułuję wnioski dotyczące stosowalności 
filozofii postsekularnej jako narzędzia teoretycznego wyjaśniającego 
sytuację religii w świecie późnonowoczesnym.
S Ł O WA  K LU C Z O W E :    postsekularyzm, filozofia religii, 
ideologia, pojęcie religii
For several years, it has seemed that every published work in the field of 
religion and philosophy of religion must take into account the declared 
paradigm shift in the study of the subject. This change has been called the 
“post secular turn”. This text is devoted to showing that from the point of 
view of the tasks of science dealing with the description and explanation 
of the different aspects of religion, the said turn is only apparent. Its osten­
sibleness lies in the fact that the program articulated by post secular phi­
losophers suffers from a number of defects. Their accumulation leads to 
the conclusion that the post secular paradigm has never existed even as the 
seed of a theory of religious phenomena, but it has some of the character­
istics of an ideology.
 This article reconstructs subjects key philosophical positions associated 
with the post secular turn (Philip Blond, Gianni Vattimo, John D. Capu­
to, Jürgen Habermas) to critical analysis in an effort to extract the rele­
vant properties of post secular philosophy to indicate major deficiencies 
(1-4). Next, I deal with the most important issue emerging from this anal­
ysis, namely, the question adopted by the post secular philosophers of reli­
gion(5). In the last part I formulate conclusions regarding the applicability 
of post secular philosophy as a theoretical tool explaining the situation of 
religion in the post-modern world.(6)
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1. Philip Blond: post secular philosophy 
and theological criticism of modernity
It is hard to say who was the first to deliberately use the term “post secular­
ism”. It seems that the first use of this term, which had a significant impact 
on the consciousness of the theoretical humanists, should be attributed to 
Philip Blond and the authors of the 199 book edited by him, Post-Secular 
Philosophy: Between Philosophy and Theology. The texts collected there are 
essentially historical in nature and are devoted to the presence of theo­
logical topics in several major modern philosophers. The basic message 
of these considerations is as follows: these motifs are not marginal, and 
even seem to be essential. The authors of these studies attempt to demon­
strate that the adoption of theological assumptions or reaching theologi­
cal applications is essential from the philosophical point of view. Philoso­
phy is therefore not able to emancipate itself from theology (and therefore 
religion), thereby denying the possibility of a secular project. This thesis, 
this time in not the historical and philosophical mode, is clearly included 
in the introduction by Blonde: only the adoption of a theological starting 
point shall protect can philosophy from the practical and the theoretical 
aporias of idle skepticism and irrational nihilism. The shortcomings of 
these two major currents of post-Kantian philosophy indicate a theologi­
cal foundation supplanted from the modern philosophical speculation. By 
theology Blond understands not a confessional reflection on the manifes­
tation of a religion, but a “meditation on the origins of being.” 1 Reflection 
upon sources of being (not mere existence) is to protect thus understood 
theology from the allegation of being an “ontotheology” formulated in 
a paradigmatic by Martin Heidegger 2 and developed by Jean Luc Marion. 3
 The book edited by Blond has become one of the so-called “radi­
cal ortho doxy” movement founding books related to the theological de­
partment of the University of Nottingham. It is not the right place to 
reconstruct the philosophical foundation of this school, it is worth not­
ing, however, that in contemporary discussions about secularization and 
post-secularism, this occupies a  position which is, in a  way, “separate”. 
Although its representatives have drawn extensively from the achieve­
ments of contemporary continental philosophy and critical social theory, 
some of the assumptions of the school’s classical program can hardly be 
1 P. Blond, Introduction: Theology before philosophy, in: Post-Secular Philosophy. Between philosop-
hy and theology, ed. P. Blond, London-New York 1997, p. 12.
2 M. Heidegger, Identyczność i różnica, transl. J. Mizera, Warszawa 2011.
3 J.-L. Marion, Bóg bez bycia, transl. M. Frankiewicz, Kraków 1996.
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considered “post-secular” in the sense of the meaning this term gained in 
the years following Blond’s publication, and which has become the domi­
nant meaning. Similarly to his just cited theses, analyses were carried out 
by the representatives of the “radical orthodoxy” movement are based on 
a kind of dogmatic solution (in a descriptive, not a derogatory sense). The 
history of the philosophical doctrines of modernity, on top of modern so­
cial and political programs, is treated there as the history of certain  aporias 
that are resolved when theological assumptions (dogma) abandoned by 
modernity, are restored.
 So we are dealing here not so much with an excess as with abandon­
ment and denial of secularism. For this reason, it is difficult to recognize 
the radical orthodoxy movement (and its underlying sources, Blond’s 
book) as the implementation of a  post-secular approach, if you accept 
the widely used understanding of the term, which insists on the abolition 
(which is a form of preservation) of the secular paradigm in the pot-sec­
ular perspective. This way or another, Blond’s book introduced the term 
post-secularism into the consciousness of humanists, and cannot be re­
garded as a decisive formulation of the post-secular program, besides, the 
term appears mainly in the title, while its more precise definition is not 
considered by any of the texts.
 Post-Secular Philosophy was a fairly general proposal to look at the part 
of the modern philosophical tradition whose direct object was not religion 
itself (understood as a social phenomenon), but at most “theology”, pecu­
liarly understood in the sense of “first philosophy”. Of course, this “theolo-
gy” can be seen as an explicit form of religious consciousness, yet, if the 
“post-secular turn” is to be seen as a change of outlook on religion in gene-
ral, and the book edited by Blond has provided arguments in favor of such 
a change only in philosophy.
2. Gianni Vattimo: religion as an unlimited 
interpretation
Bond-edited book documents the returning religious motives also among 
the authors associated with the widely understood post-structuralism and 
deconstruction. However, a  seminar organized by Gianni Vattimo on 
 Capri in 1994, and then the publication being the aftermath of it, 4 posed 
the question of reframing the attitude towards religion in the context of 
4 Religia: seminarium na Capri prowadzone przez Jacquesa Derridę i  Gianniego Vattimo, transl. 
M. Kowalska, Warszawa 1999.
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the “end of metaphysics” directly. It is worth noting that the concept of 
“post-secularism” does not play any significant role in the texts collected 
by Vattimo.
 He openly admits that “only because the metaphysical meta-narra­
tions have disintegrated, philosophy rediscovered the credibility of reli­
gions and may consequently perceive the need for religion in the collective 
consciousness outside of the box of the Enlightenment criticism”. 5 The 
main “metaphysical metanarratives” include, according to Vattimo, who 
uncritically follows the trail of the trivialized revelations of Heidegger, 
a story about the first principle and the very classic (“metaphysical”) con­
cept of truth. This means that religion is released from the tribunal of rea­
son without conviction not because it was acquitted, but because the tri­
bunal was solved. Religion ceases to be a problem for philosophy, because 
in general it ceases to be considered in terms of truth or falsity. Instead, in 
line with the general scheme of the development of nihilism, described by 
Nietzsche, forcing a functional justification of religion, which is (contrary 
to what Vattimo would like), another variant of moral justification. If reli­
gion can no longer be itself, i.e., “righteous worship of the true God”, 6 let it 
be compensated by aesthetic and existential needs. Therefore, the key, the 
above-cited sentence by Vattimo introduces the typically nihilistic concept 
of “religious need”. The subject matter is similarly handled by Richard 
Rorty, who, despite different intellectual roots, goes on this in the same di­
rection as Vattimo: “Religion raised from the epistemic sphere, which con­
siders the dispute between theism and atheism as insignificant, can pro­
vide the right solution tailored to the needs of our loneliness.” 7 “Raising 
from the epistemic sphere” and “insignificance dispute between theism 
and atheism” means just abandoning the truth of religion a fundamental 
issue for all traditional religious communities.
 The post-secular project in its deconstructionist variant is therefore en­
tirely dependent on the controversial “findings” of post-heideggerian cri­
tique of metaphysics. Vattimo sees them as certain obvious data. There­
fore, the overall criticism of his proposal would have to be a criticism of 
this whole philosophical formation. It would take far too much space and 
should not be the main theme of my work. Instead, I would like to tackle 
the element which is a link between the criticism of metaphysics and Vat­
timo’s post-secular project.
 Vattimo identifies the “God of metaphysics”, with the God of reli­
gion of violence. The reason for identification is the association of the 
5 G. Vattimo, Ślad śladu, in: Religia: seminarium…, p. 105.
6 Cf. S. Th. IIª-IIae, q. 81.
7 R. Rorty, Antyklerykalizm i ateizm, in: R. Roty, G. Vattimo, Przyszłość religii, Kraków 2010, p. 50.
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absoluteness of one rule and the right of order because of the absolute­
ness of violence. It is hard to talk here about a  clear inference. Vattimo 
uses a paralogism of identifying two phenomena on the basis of the over­
all similarity of their selected characteristics. If one wanted to reconstruct 
some arguments behind this game of associations, it would have to include 
a condition under which each classically understood truth (by the every 
virtue of being true) would be directly a source of suffering and violence. 
So, the premise presupposes a radical extension of the concept of violence 
in relation to the standard one: violence is an action which is not only con­
trary to the nature of the action, but in general any situation in which the 
subject encounters an obstacle in the form of objective conditions, such as 
“the law of God”. Vattimo, as a deconstructionist, of course, does not ac­
cept the concept of “human nature”, but that is why he is not in a position 
to designate the boundaries that the individual has the right to face right­
eously. In this situation, the very existence of a “truth”, like “the first prin­
ciple”, that is, God is violence.
 That is why the end of metaphysics means, for Vattimo, weakening 
of the God of the religion of violence. At this point, Vattimo makes a fur­
ther identification: death of this “metaphysics of God” is identified with 
the process of secularization. Since the religion of “the God of metaphys­
ics” is a strong religion of the visible worship and the “law of God”, the 
end to the power of religion, the loss of its visibility and giving up “legal” 
thinking” is the end of such a religion. The twilight of the God of meta­
physics, the God of “natural religion of violence” means the possibility of 
a real revelation, “which essence boils down to charity”. 8 On the basis of 
this quasi-Marcionist concept Vattimo may propose the conclusion that 
secularization is not a process of disappearance of religion in general, but 
its primary violent form, and at the same time the process of a true revela­
tion of the religion of love, which is manifested in the fact that man wor­
ships the God who died. In short, according to Vattimo, secularization is 
the work of Christianity, which ends on Good Friday.
 It would be interesting to consider whether this refreshed, but already 
old “death of God theology” is a place for the Easter Sunday. This fact is 
hard to imagine without a very strong “metaphysical” commitment: “And 
if Christ has not been raised, our preaching is useless and so is your faith” 
(1 Corinthians 15:14). It seems that such commitments are inevitable. 
Of course, Vattimo will claim that the “God of Christianity” is a “weak 
God”, having nothing in common with the God of metaphysics. The 
above-quoted words of the New Testament cast doubt on the validity of 
this thesis. Besides, the path of extracting of the essence of Christianity 
8 G. Vattimo, Belief, Stanford UP 1999, p. 77.
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from “metaphysical accretions” from the Scripture, is already well-trodden 
since long ago, and we know that it ends in a dead end. Finally, the radical 
program of “demythologization” (so was called the process of “cleaning” 
religion from metaphysical accretion) ends with a paradox: trying to distill 
the “true religion”, one creates an outline of some formula of spirituality 
that had never existed from the existing elements of religion. Vattimo, of 
course, can take on the burden of being a prophet of a completely new re­
ligion, and no one can forbid him or other writers like him, to hatch their 
para-religious reflection. At the time, however, when we treat him like this, 
from a partner in philosophical discussion about religion, he will change 
into the object of ethnographic research.
 I would like to finish this critical presentation of Vattimo’s concept by 
paying attention to the constructive part of his design. According to Vatti­
mo, in the articulation of religious beliefs, metaphysics should be replaced 
by hermeneutics. And in this respect, the Italian philosopher goes along 
the path marked by Heidegger and trodden by many obedient religious 
philosophers and theologians. Secularism is not only the most important 
act of “loosening” metaphysics and a revelation taking place, but a depar­
ture from literalism and disseminating “free study”. 9 Rather than estab­
lishing and protecting religious truths, religious consciousness would be 
busy with religious interpretation that reveals more and more new mean­
ings contained in revelation. On the basis of the same analogy, which con­
nects violence with metaphysics, it is combined with literalism and the re­
alism of the “legal” understanding of the word of God. Vattimo calls this 
process “freeing metaphors” and admits that the return of interest in terms 
from the dictionary of religion in continental philosophy is associated with 
this process. It would appear in such a way that the post-secular turn in 
philosophy is the result of the peculiarly understood Revelation and part of 
the history of salvation. 
 Vattimo’s position, however, is extreme: the abandonment of establish­
ing a “religious truth” not only means giving up the dictionary of classical 
metaphysics, but in general removes any explicit rules from religious inter­
pretation. Vattimo clearly marks his distance from Gadamer’s philosophi­
cal hermeneutics 10 which – although far from “metaphysical” understand­
ing of truth rehabilitated legal and philological hermeneutics. The task of 
interpretation (including the interpretation, which is secularism and is rev­
elation), meanwhile, is to be uninhibited, free, not oriented to understand­
ing the meaning of the source, but rather on producing sense. In short, Vat­
timo does not impose any rules on the correctness of the interpretation.
9 Ibidem, p. 60.
10 G. Vattimo, After Christianity, Columbia UP 2002, p. 62-63.
Post-secular mirages
16
perspektywy kultury (nr 21)
 Vattimo is trying to forestall criticism of this concept, noting that these 
free examinations of the Scripture cannot be completely arbitrary, as the fi­
nal interpretation is the rule is charity. 11 The intention to prevent complete 
freedom of interpretation should be noted, however, it seems to be com­
pletely empty. It is hard to say how the resolving of conflicting interpreta­
tions of revelation would result from the “charity”. “Charity” as the only 
limiting rule would not be any useful rule for interpretation, because that 
is how it would resolve the specific result of interpretation itself is not ob­
vious and requires interpretation.
3. John D. Caputo: religion without declarative 
statements
The deconstructive variant of the post-secular idea presented in a number 
of publications by John D. Caputo can be subjected to similar criticism. 
Like Vattimo, he exploits the figure of the “weak God” who is left with 
only a contingent, indirectly manifested love. Caputo places great empha­
sis on the unconditioned reality toward which the believer turns. What we 
believe, if we believe, is a stable and reliable principle, definitely not more 
the reason for existence, but rather, “the impossible”. What shows up as 
impossible, thus what you can always expect (the impossible cannot be 
bound by arguments, which would exclude it) is the subject of a true, un­
conditioned love, which is eo ipso a religious act.
 Caputo attempts to clarify that it is not “simple or absolute impos­
sibility, such as ‘p at the same time not-p’, which boils down to incon­
sistency, but what the French philosopher Jacques Derrida calls ‘the 
impossible’, referring to what we do not anticipate and cannot predict, 
something the eye has not seen, and no human mind could comprehend 
(1  Corinthians 2,9)’.” 12 If so, then Derrida should rather talk about the un­
predictable, not the impossible. This is not a purely verbal complaint be­
cause Caputo also uses the consequences of identifying the subject of re­
ligious faith with the impossible, which is the exclusion of objective states 
of affairs from the scope of religious language. This is because the impos­
sible cannot be the subject of existential judgment. Caputo’s concept nec­
essarily requires that that was what happened with the objects of religious 
belief, just because it can protect them from the Enlightenment criticism. 
Consequently, Caputo’s conceptual design is fundamentally inconsistent: 
11 Ibidem, p. 82.
12 J.D. Caputo, On Religion, London 2001, p. 10.
Paweł Grad – Post-secular philosophy
17
he treats objects of religious faith as if they were impossible (and therefore 
“unreasonable”), although he explains the impossibility by the notion of 
unpredictability. However, it is obvious that this cannot be done, because 
not everything unpredictable at the same time impossible.
 Such an ontology of the objects of religious faith justifies post-secular 
reorientation towards religion: “Today, at this point, which I call a post-
secular or post-modern, religious meaning of life is directed towards what 
I call hyper-real and by which I mean more than the reality above what is 
real is the impossible, what defies the limited, modern idea of  what is pos­
sible. 13 The “hyper-real” cannot be subjected to normal judgment. 
This idea implies going beyond literalism, fundamentalism and open su­
perstition without repeating the Enlightenment’s critique of superstition, 
whose assumptions – as I have tried to show – have been widely challen­
ged. Nevertheless, ‘religion without religion’ requires full ‘religious truth’, 
which, however, must be sharply distinguished from the ‘true religion’ 
in the sense of ‘the one true religion’ (which always, invariably means: 
mine-not-yours). 14
However, this truth is not a normal judgment: 
Religious truth is not the truth of a statement – a kind of truth that co­
mes from organizing our knowledge, from the distribution of our cogniti­
ve content according to what the world is like: so that when we say ‘S is p’ 
it means that we give a certain Sp the shape our opinion. Religious truth 
belongs to another order, to order or sphere, which Augustine calls facere 
veritatem, ‘doing’ or ‘making’ the truth, even, and perhaps especially when 
we are called to transcend our abilities and to do the impossible. 15
 In this case, however, something must be done with the undeniable 
fact that the religious languages contain many sentences formed as judg­
ments. Caputo’s solution to this situation is to reduce their epistemic con­
tent through the historical relativism. 16 However, in order for the religious 
language not to remain only a historical artifact, it is necessary to propose 
a different function than the expression of the truth about the reality of 
God and his grace. Just like in Vattimo’s case, the function of this is to pro­
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One thing that – to put it this way – fell from the sky, is the love of God, 
which descends upon us in the form of questions: ‘What do I love when 
I love my God?’. 17
 It seems doubtful whether there may be a religious language consist­
ing only of this kind of performatives, about which Caputo speaks. Such 
a language does not imply any reference to what exists (is real), but only 
“produce” its “truths” in a way that directs the speaker to that which does 
not exist, but is the Impossible, that (according to Caputo) is not possible 
to predict. The only function of religious language would be, therefore, 
the production of a certain attitude towards reality involving the antici­
pation of something that cannot be predicted (and thus positively iden­
tified). This idea has probably a lot to do with the Derrida’s reduction of 
religion to a purely formal “messianic” function” bereft of all metaphysi­
cism and reduced to pure “expectations”. 18 Perhaps it is possible to think 
of such a religion without any quantum of positive knowledge about God, 
not treating the object of its worship as something real, but something 
that by definition, and always only coming. Surely this is not any known 
religion.
 Of course all religious speculation of Derrida, as an assumption, ig­
nore the meaning of the original texts on which it is based, but it is worth 
noting that the interpretation presented by him and repeated by Caputo 
of the fragment of “making truth” (facere veritatem) from the Confessions 
of St. Augustine is not sustainable. 19 This passage does not provide any ba­
sis to formulate “the definition” of religious truth, which opposes “mak­
ing” truth “telling” the truth in the sense of expressing true judgments. In 
his Tractates on the Gospel of John, we can find an exact explanation 20 from 
which it is clear that “making truth” lies in such behavior that is com pliant 
with the law of God, which depends on enlightenment and knowing God’s 
17 A dozen pages later Caputo responds in the style of a poor psychological advice book: “God is 
a passion for life, the passion of my life, the passion of what is unknown to me, a desire for the 
impossible” (ibid, p. 135).
18 Cf. J. Derrida, Wiara i wiedza, transl. P. Mrówczyński, in: Religia: seminarium…, p. 27.
19 “Thou desirest truth” and ‘he who does the truth comes to the light’ This is what I wish to do 
through confession in my heart before thee (volo eam facere in corde meo), and in my writings 
before many witnesses. St. Augustine Confessions, Book X, Ch. 1, transl. Albert C. Outler, Dal­
las 1955
20 How is it thou doest the truth? Thou dost not caress, nor soothe, nor flatter thyself; nor say, 
“I am righteous,” whilst thou art unrighteous: thus, thou beginnest to do the truth. Thou co­
mest to the light, that thy works may be made manifest that they are wrought in God; for thy 
sin, the very thing that has given thee displeasure, would not have displeased thee, if God did 
not shine into thee, and His truth show it thee. (St. Augustine, Homilies on the Gospel of John; 
XII, Ch. III, 13).
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truth. Of course Caputo’s thesis regarding the nature of religious language 
is not ultimately dependent on the veracity of the interpretation of the 
phrase by St. Augustine. However, Caputo says clearly that this is just exact 
understanding of the truth of religion that St. Augustine means when he 
speaks about making truth. The overthrow of this claim, therefore, addi­
tionally weakens Caputo’s argumentation, in particular his belief that his 
interpretation of the language of religion was (or should be) also shared by 
members of the traditional religious communities. The use of the author­
ity of St. Augustine is to serve this purpose.
4. Jürgen Habermas: post secularism as a project 
to translate religious language
The author who gave the concept of post-secularism actual weight was 
Jürgen Habermas. In a  series of lectures and articles he formulated the 
concept representing an outline of what can be called a  model of post-
-secular social order. Importantly, Habermas’s proposal is sociological and 
theoretical-political: not applicable to “theology”, “post-secular philoso­
phy” or, religion in general, but a fairly detailed question of “the presence 
of religion in the public sphere”. Habermas, known for his commitment 
to the modernization Enlightenment projects and proposes a revaluation 
of the principles of the public functioning of religion in modern Western 
libe ral democracies (this is another limitation of the scope of its design, 
well worth remembering). This revaluation is based on the recognition 
that the game of social forces of “secularism” and religion is not a zero-
sum game 21 and that the citizens with a religious worldview can and even 
should make a significant contribution to the public debate in the form of 
the symbolic capital of religious inspiration and arguments.
 Habermas is primarily interested in the theory of communication and 
functioning of religion in the context of public debate. No wonder that 
even the resulting project of post-secular society (or post-secular public 
debate) is located on the same plane. According to Habermas, in fact, the 
post-secular project is realized in practice of translating religious content 
to widely available (and therefore “lay”) content. In this way, the religious 
citizens gain the opportunity of political recognition and participation 
as religious citizens, while the non-religious citizens are granted the ability 
to empower their ethical imagination with motivations of religious origin.
21 J. Habermas, Wierzyć i wiedzieć, transl. M. Łukasiewicz, „Znak” nr 568, p. 10.
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 Habermas imposes a number of restrictions on this project of the trans­
lation, which are also the limitations used by his concept of post-secular­
ism. It is worth listing them here, because they often become forgotten 
when discussing the role of Habermas in the “post-secular turn”.
 First of all, Habermas is only interested in religion in the public sphere. 
His project is not a project for religion in general, and in particular it does 
not directly apply to a translation (and possibly associated with changing 
of meaning) within the religious community. Of course, there are good 
reasons to wonder whether the adoption of the principles of operation by 
a particular religion in the public sphere will not affect its internal self-un­
derstanding. However, this issue is not a direct concern of Habermas.
 Secondly, the requirement of translation is not applicable only within 
the religious community (and therefore following liberal criteria in the pri­
vate sphere), but also at the level of public institutions of the state. While in 
the first case, the translation is not necessary (because the members of the 
religious community “understand each other” without it), in the second 
case it is assumed that it has already been made in the pre-institutiona-
lized public sphere which is intermediary between the private sphere and 
the public sphere of the state institutions. In the last, “only secular argu­
ments count.” 22
 Thirdly, if a religious citizen sees, in a particular situation, a require­
ment to translate religion rationale into secular language as a  violation 
of their own identity, they are exempt from this requirement. In this sit­
uation, they can introduce religious content in an untranslated and un-
-universalized form into discussion, which involves non-religious citizens 
as well. 
 Thus clarified, Habermas’s concept seems to generate some serious 
difficulties.
 Firstly, it is not clear whether such a narrow post-secular program rep­
resents a real change in relation to the secular one, and so at the same time, 
is it at all justified to call it “post-secular”. Veit Bader argues that the postu­
late of respecting the principle of neutrality (and therefore “universality”) 
for allowing religious arguments to informal public debate is in no way 
contrary to the perfectly secular order of constitutional liberalism. 23 More­
over, the secular “neutrality” of the state institutions seems to be the most 
significant achievement of modern “secularism”. 
22 J.  Habermas, Religia w  sferze publicznej. Poznawcze założenia „publicznego czyniania użytku 
z rozumu” przez obywatelni wierzących i niewierzących, in: Eadem, Między naturalizmem a reli-
gią, Warszawa 2012, p. 115.
23 V. Bader, Post-secularism or liberal-democratic constitutionalism?, “Erasmus Law Review” vol. 5, 
issue 5.
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 The second very often raised doubt 24 is summed up in the question 
whether the practice of religious content manipulation postulated by 
Habermas actually should be called religious language translation. Haber­
mas does not seem to attach more weight to the appropriateness of this 
term and does not define it. On the other hand, he applies it consistently 
with the intention of it defining the idea of post-secular society. He also 
does not give many examples of such a translation, nevertheless, the ones 
that ho does provide actually make us reflect on whether we are dealing 
with the translation of religious content. It is difficult to recognize that 
the truth about “the dignity of the human person”, which is not easily 
subjected to naturalistic reduction, is simply a translation of the religious 
doctrine of “creation of man in the image and likeness of God” or not. 25 
Surely one can reasonably wonder whether from the historical and genea­
logical point of view, the emergence of the Christian and Jewish teaching 
does not constitute (in the sense of social capital convictions) a necessary 
condition for the formulation of the doctrine of the inherent dignity of the 
human  being. However, it is difficult to recognize the sentence “Every hu­
man  being has the inherent and inalienable dignity” for a translation of 
the sentence “Every man was created by God in his image and likeness”. 
The first sentence is probably a practical implication of the second sen­
tence, however, it is not simply the semantic reflection in another language 
or idiom that is not its translation.
 The third group of difficulties associated with the concept of the im­
portance of language and translation implied by Habermas’s project. 
A  premise of the post-secular program of translating religious language is 
the argument that religious arguments are “not available” to religious citi­
zens, so that these citizens cannot give them a tangible meaning as argu­
ments. In other words, they cannot – just as the religious citizens seem 
to be able to – neither deny nor confirm the content of the theses con­
tained in these arguments. This simply means that they do not know the 
meaning of sentences from the dictionary of the religion (I assume that the 
 ability to deny or confirm the assertions contained in the given sentence is 
a necessary element in understanding its meaning). In the discussion with 
Charles Taylor, Habermas concludes that the understanding of religious 
language requires being a member of the particular religious community, 
24 Cf. B. Arfi, Habermas and the aporia of translating religion in democracy, “European Journal of 
Social Theory” 18:4; G.  Areshidze, Taking Religion Seriously? Habermas on Religious Trans-
lation and Cooperative Learning in Post-secular Society, “American Policital Science Review” 
vol. 111, issue 4.
25 This is what Habermas claims in his debate with Charles Taylor. Cf. Dialogue, in: The Power of 
Religion in the Public Sphere, ed. E. Mendieta, J. VanAntwerpen, New York 2011, p. 62.
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and in particular participation in its rituals and worship. 26 This note is an 
interesting and not obvious example of appreciation of the role of ritual 
and liturgical practice as a fundamental way of participation and under­
standing of religion coming from the mouth of a contemporary human­
ist. Nevertheless, from the point of view of the theory of meaning, the 
thesis that, ultimately, understanding of the importance of religious lan­
guage required participation in a religious practice, is negating the possi­
bility of translation in the case of radical religious language. Consequently, 
the “translation” can only be accomplished by someone who has mastered 
the full extent of both dictionaries, that is to say, by a member of the re­
ligious community. Such a person is involved in the practices of a given 
community, and at the same time, under the “universality of reason”, they 
have access to secular reason. Such an understanding of the conditions of 
translation, however, generates at least three difficulties for the post-secu­
lar project of Habermas.
 Firstly, the idea of “mutual learning” 27 between religious and non-re­
ligious citizens is drastically reduced. Unbelievers, therefore, are not able 
to learn anything themselves, and can only be instructed by the believers, 
whose only is the task of translation. 
 Secondly, such a restriction is contrary to the aforementioned propos­
als of Habermas, according to which in the case of the inability to make 
a translation without the loss of identity, religious citizens have the right to 
speak in a public debate using religious reason. In this situation, non-reli­
gious citizens should try to bring out widely available content from the re­
ligious content. But if they cannot understand the latter, they do not know 
how they could do this.
 Thirdly, Habermas takes as a given that there is a body of widely un­
derstood natural truths that is large enough to be the base of a common 
policy. Unfortunately, one can expect that in the political practice of secu­
lar states there are entire sets of naturalistic truths and naturalistically de­
scribed values that are universal in this way. This complaint stems from 
the very nature of practical reason, which is always involved in the recog­
nition of specific, contingent situations – the rules commonly known, but 
there is no universal agreement on how to follow them. In this situation, 
no actual political stance can release itself from the obligation of discus­
sion: argumentation and presenting its case. The possibility of such a dis­
cussion is precisely the well-understood “universality of reason”, but one 
cannot use it to justify the universal (“natural”) obviousness of practical 
positions. Thus, as some would have it, “post secularism” means primarily 
26 Ibidem, p. 61.
27 Cf. J. Habermas, Wiedzieć i wierzyć…, p. 19.
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the “denaturalization” of secularism, 28 it is at this crucial point of the post-
-secular project that Habermas would not be a post-secular thinker.
5. What religion is in post secular philosophy
The most common defect of post-secular philosophy are falling into in­
consistency and generating difficulty that abolishes the assumptions of 
the post-secular concept formulated by philosophers. The most important 
source of these inconsistencies is the inner ambivalence of these theories, 
which at the same time report claims to describe the essence of traditio-
nal religion (e.g. “The essence of revelation”), and project a certain non-
-existent post-secular religion, which only connects loosely with religions 
in the ordinary sense and processes some of their traditional symbols and 
motifs.
 Some of the post-secular philosophers are aware of this difficulty 
and try to reject it. Agata Bielik-Robson does it in a way which is worth 
 focusing on.
 Firstly, Bielik-Robson tries to dismiss criticism coming out from self-
understanding of the representatives of traditional religions (although she 
also mentions the secular criticism of post-secularism). The thesis that re­
ligion of post-secularists “is non-existent religion, philosophically crafted, 
and in addition instrumentally used by modern thought, to which religion 
in naturally resistant”, is rejected. 29
 In response, Bielik-Robson puts three theses, which are to be the basis 
refutation of this thesis by critics. 
 The first argument is that “religion is something more than just a set of 
archaic dogmas”.
 The second argument is that religion “is also a  great metaphysical 
speculation”.
 The third thesis is that “perhaps the most important one”: 
the speculation may concern not only of the living, present, providential 
God, to whom we direct our mercenary prayers – but also, and in the times 
of modernity, above all, ‘the absent God’, ‘God, who withdrew’ or even the 
‘God, who died’. 30
28 U. Parmaksiz, Making Sense of the Postsekular, “European Jounral of Social Theory” vol. 21, 
 issue. 1, s. 10.
29 A. Bielik-Robson, Deus otiosus, in: Deus otiosus. Nowoczesność w perspektywie postsekularnej, red. 
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 Let us focus on these theses as arguments against the above-presented 
criticism of the post-secular paradigm.
 The first thesis implies that the critics of the post-secular paradigm are 
of the opinion that religion is only supposedly “an archaic set of dogmas”. 
I believe it would be difficult to find a critic of the paradigm who would 
proclaim such a thesis. Certainly according to such critics religion cannot 
be reduced to ‘a set of dogmas’, although they may maintain that dogmas 
are an important part of a particular religious doctrine.
 What is more – and here we move to the second thesis – such dog­
mas were often formulated by speculative metaphysical notions. There­
fore, the opposition between “archaic dogmas” and “metaphysical specu­
lation” is not justified. Certainly many religious traditions have created 
their meta physical speculations. A significant issue in a dispute with criti­
cism of post-secularism is, therefore, not a matter of whether religion also 
includes the metaphysical speculation, but rather what this speculation is. 
It seems that orthodox metaphysical speculation for explication dogmas 
within religions is less interesting for Agata Bielik-Robson, however, it is 
so for reasons that have nothing to do with the question whether religion, 
as such, includes metaphysical speculation.
 It is important that, as a general rule, such speculation so far has it is 
part of a religion, belongs to the important self-awareness of the members 
of the religious community, and it cannot fall into contradiction with such 
a “set of dogmas” understood as a non-speculative outline of the truths of 
the religion. If it fell into that contradiction and became indelible, a “meta-
physical speculation” would become separated from the religion. It can 
keep its “religious” nature, i.e. include some theological assertions, it can 
even become the nucleus of a new religious doctrine, but I cannot see any 
reason to regard the very “metaphysical speculation” as religion. Even in 
cases where the metaphysical speculation of philosophers separated itself 
from worship (as in the Arab enlightenment or in the Greek classical pe­
riod and late antiquity), there was still tension between them involving 
not only the contradictions – metaphysicians could argue that learning the 
true nature of a deity they worship him or her more fully than the “dark” 
people in their rituals, but as a rule they rarely resorted to a final abandon­
ment of “archaic” forms of religion. Even if the they created their true wor­
ship based only on the metaphysical speculation, it would be a completely 
new religion, different from what is normally defined by this name. And 
sometimes, as in the case of the Pythagoreans, the new philosophical doc­
trine was followed a new way of worship. “Religion” in the normal sense 
demands “worship”, i.e. activities that are worshiping the Deity.
 At this point question arises, of course, of whether Agata Bielik-Rob­
son wants to argue that metaphysical speculation belonging to a religion, 
Paweł Grad – Post-secular philosophy
25
which post-secularism is interested is a  part of the traditional religions 
(even if in a transformed or modern form) or is it the beginning (and per­
haps the right form) of some new, previously unknown religion.
 I find it hard to decide, as in the case of the post-secular philosophy 
practiced by Agata Bielik-Robson. Her books mainly operate the “ crypto 
theological” themes in the well-known modern authors, which means 
roughly that she is looking for variations on theological topics in the writ­
ings whose authors cannot be attributed intentions to create some kind 
of “religion”. On the basis of these explorations, Bielik-Robson is even 
tempted to formulate the outline of a late-modern vitalistic spirituality for­
mula built with deconstructed elements of Judaic, or rather, post- Judaistic 
thought (materialistic philosophy of history and culture handling gene-
ralized patterns of theological figures of thought). It seems that even if 
Bielik -Robson is interested in “metaphysical speculation” belonging to the 
historical traditions of religion, she is also not interested in whether this 
speculation falls in contradiction with the principles of the religious tradi­
tion in which she was raised.
 As far as the philosophers of the post-secular current analyzed above, 
such as Caputo and Vattimo, are concerned, it is clear that they refer to 
non-religious (or post-religious) speculation which is post-metaphysical 
in order to use it to draft a radical restructuring of traditional religion (e.g. 
Christianity). Moreover, as we have seen, dogmatic identification of the 
principles of this post-religious speculation with some element of a reli­
gious doctrine (e.g. “the weakness of God” with “Incarnation”) is not an 
explicated, but an explicating foundation of its conceptual design. In the 
case of these post-secular philosophers, we also cannot say that they tack­
le “metaphysical speculation” that would be part of the historic religions. 
Rather, it is an autonomous speculation outside religion, serving the for­
mulation of a new program of spirituality or a new religion from decon­
structed fragments of the language of traditional religion.
 Justification of the argument that the “religion” which post-secu­
lar philosophy talks about is not a religion in the right sense, is crucial 
for the whole of my considerations. This thesis requires the adoption 
of some criteria by which we distinguish “religion in the proper sense”. 
I tend to accept the view that the task of the philosopher is not direct es-
tablishment of such criteria, but their clarification. The philosopher for­
mulates solutions (and possibly clearer conceptualizations) but not the 
issues, which he rather just finds. This applies in particular to social phe­
nomena, whose existence is completely independent of the existence of 
philosophy. In our case, this issue is religion in modern society, in par­
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 In the case reported here, post-secular authors, following the argu­
ments cited by Agata Bielik-Robson, the issue of this criterion is concre­
tized in the question about the legitimacy of the third of the theses put by 
this author: whether the religion which the post-secular philosophy pro­
jects can actually be a religion of “the God who died”? It seems that if we 
agree – and I think there is no other possibility – that “post-secularism” 
is intended as a transgression and abolition of the “secular” paradigm, the 
answer to these questions must be negative.
 Since the post-secular paradigm is a different solution to the same is­
sue of the place of religion in modern society as the “secular” paradigm, 
its outlook on the issue of religion is highly dependent on it. The  scientific 
basis of thus understood secular paradigm is a  theory of secularization, 
which deals with the description and explanation of the transformation 
and disappearance of the forms of religious life in the modernizing society. 
Despite the enormous diversity of the various specific theories of seculari­
zation, and even attempts to challenge this paradigm in sociology of reli­
gion in recent decades, it remains clear that “religion” means, first of all, 
the traditional religion, i.e. the belief systems and practices that are forms 
of life built around the worship of God: real, historical examples of “reli­
gion”. In particular (for historical reasons) the secularization theory con­
cerns transformations of various Christian denominations. What I recalled 
above is enough to conclude that the very wording of the issue of seculari­
zation, secularism and thus post-secularism exclude the recognition that 
the post-secular project can be about the formulation of some proposals to 
create a completely new religion to limit to metaphysical speculation about 
the “God who died”. Had it been so, “post-secularism” would be in fact 
not a breaching of the secular paradigm because it would address a com­
pletely different “religion”.
 The most likely explanation of the “God death” metaphor excludes the 
recognition, that it can be a part of the dictionary of metaphysical specu­
lation belonging to any religion. Both Hegel 31 (who took it from Luther­
an Passion songs 32) as well as Nietzsche, who gave the ultimate mean­
ing to this metaphor, the “death of God” means the moment in which the 
pro per (i.e. declared) reasons for the truths and worship of a given reli­
gion are widely disputed. This religion may then still remain in a nihilist 
31 G.W.F. Hegel, Glauben und Wissen, in: Hegel Gesammelte Werke Bd. 4, ed. H. Buchner O. Poeg­
geler, Hamburg 1968, s. 413.
32 As to the second of the seven stanzas of the hymn O Traurigkeit, o Herzeleid added by Pastor 
Johann von Rist to the first version taken from a Catholic song-book published in Wurzburg 
in 1628. The minister replaced seven Catholic stanzas with his own and published them in his 
own song-book in 1641.
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form, as a pure morality, which it is undoubtedly a state of false conscious­
ness. The question of the function of such a  post-nihilistic religion, or 
post-Christianity is very interesting, but there is no doubt that it should 
be regarded as a religion devoid of its essential purpose. It becomes – as 
 Nietzsche saw himself – religion adapted and adapting to the secular out­
side. Certainly Nietzsche saw a sociological fact that the facade of religion 
can  continue even if its foundations are removed (i.e. the belief in a “living 
God”). Never theless, it was clear that the discovery of this truth means the 
end of religion, and not the new beginning.
 It is difficult to identify a religion possessing indeed the death of God 
theology, after which there is only a “trace” of absence. After a Good Fri­
day there always comes a Resurrection Sunday. The cabbalistic doctrine of 
cimcum formulated by Isaac Luria, which is so readily recalled in this con­
text, is not itself a germ of any new religion, but it functions within Juda­
ism, along with the canonical teachings on the omnipotent and providen­
tial God of Israel. 33 What is more, this doctrine of the “withdrawal” of God 
is also fundamentally different from the post-metaphysical theology of the 
“weak God”. Cimcum is an act in which God “retreats” to make room for 
creation, however, this does not deny its mastery over the latter or the pos­
sibility of intervention and in any way not “weaken” His almighty power.
 In other words, the death of God, religion cannot be the “abolition” of 
secularism, but rather, it is an appropriate form of duration of the “rem­
nants” of religion in secular reality. If “post-secularism” would be a discov­
ery of such a religion, it would, in fact, not constitute any transcendence of 
the secular paradigm.
6. Findings
The summary of the analysis conducted here can be presented in the fol­
lowing conclusions concerning the recent development and prospects of 
the post-secular philosophy.
 1. The post-secular paradigm in the proper sense is characterized by 
two convictions. The first consists in denying the thesis of a necessary con­
nection between progress and modernization and complete absence of re­
ligion or negative secularism. The second belief is to maintain the thesis 
of the success of the positive secularization understood as emancipation 
from the “fundamentalist” forms of religious life. Religion understood as 
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a post-secular paradigm is part of the modernization process emancipat­
ing the society from “the religion of violence”. Therefore, such forms of 
criticism and abolition of the goods of modernization should not be con­
sidered as “post-secular”, if they tend to the restoration of “pre-modern” 
forms of religious thought and practice. For this reason, the school of radi­
cal orthodoxy cannot be considered part of the post-secular current.
 2. When assessing the range of theoretical post-secular philosophers, 
we should keep in mind that they relate to very different ranges of the so­
cial existence of religion (e.g. in theology, political representation, herme­
neutics of religious texts), and that these areas do not overlap with each 
other often. This promotes mutual inconsistencies of the views presented 
here. There is no coherent and comprehensive project of a “post-secular 
paradigm” inside post-secular philosophy.
 3. The thinkers associated with this current formulate proposals, which 
suffer from the following defects: they are internally inconsistent and they 
use undefined ad hoc concepts to explain religious phenomena.  Moreover, 
in their lectures on their concept, the post-secular philosophers make some 
rudimentary factual errors, which reduce the credibility of their proposals 
as perspectives on actual religious phenomena.
 4. These defects lead to a lack of control over the analysis of religious 
phenomena, which turns into multiplication of in fact deeply secular be­
liefs about it: identification of traditional religion with violence, reduction 
of religion to an anti-oppressive morality, the conviction of the “irrationa-
lism” of religious beliefs and their radical “untranslatability”, negating the 
criteria for institutional settlement of the orthodoxy of religious doctrine 
interpretations, etc.
 5. The consistency with which all the post-secular philosophers ana­
lyzed here goes back to the issue of religious language and the translation 
thereof. I believe this is because, first of all, the treatment of religion pri­
marily as “text”, or perhaps a reservoir of symbols, in isolation from the 
normative and regulating context of the ritual and religious practice. This 
is a symptomatic phenomenon in the philosophy of religion, which is only 
slowly starting to be corrected. 34 This adjustment is necessary, if philoso­
phy of religion has to have an adequate concept its own your subject. This 
is connected with the next point.
 6. The most important problem of post-secular concepts is the lack of 
even a provisional settlement what religion is, and, in particular, if they 
are interested in historical, actual religion, or rather the project they are 
only drawing up. In the least this applies to Habermas, who, as a social re­
searcher, has a direct orientation on the understanding of the contemporary 
34 Cf. K. Schilbrack, Philosophy and the Study of Religions. A Manifesto, Chichester 2014.
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situation of historical religion, however, my reasons indicated above, also 
this attempt ends in failure and projection (instead of a  description) of 
forms of religious life.
 This is the problem which decides on the fact that post-secular philoso­
phy did not arrive – despite nearly twenty years of work in this field – at any 
real theory of religious issues in late modernity. Replacing the reliable con­
cept of a historical religion with a non-existing project, however, results in 
the fact that attempts already made are rather ideological than actual. The 
authors also project and – with limited resources that scientific work pro­
vides – push their project of radical change in thinking about religion, not 
providing the tools to explain its phenomena. Their concepts do not serve 
the purpose of getting clarity on the issues of religion, but rather provide 
justifications for the changes in religious life. Until post-secular philoso­
phy chooses to fill a proper task for philosophy, which is to clarify existing 
problems, the deadlock will not be broken. You cannot, of course, in no way 
prohibit any author to write religious on religion, where they draw a vision 
of a  completely new religion. There is no apparent reason, however, for 
the author to use the authority of a researcher and philosopher, and for his 
 ideas to be recognized for their contribution to the study of religion.
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